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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1556 
___________ 
 
AHMAD REZA SHAYESTEH,  
a/k/a BEHROOZ KAREEM BEHNEZHAD, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A022-718-461) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 16, 2015 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 23, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner Ahmad Reza Shayesteh petitions for review of a final order of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons detailed 
below, we will deny the petition for review.   
 According to the Government, Shayesteh is a citizen of Iran who entered the 
United States in 1978 as a non-immigrant student and later adjusted his status to lawful 
permanent resident.  The Government further contends that, in 1988, Shayesteh was 
convicted in the District of Arizona, under the alias Behrooz Benazad, of mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  Shayesteh, meanwhile, claims that he was born in 
Houston, Texas, is a United States citizen, has never heard the name “Behrooz Benazad,” 
and has not been convicted of mail fraud. 
 It is undisputed, however, that in 1997, Shayesteh was convicted in the District of 
Utah of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment.  The Department of 
Homeland Security then charged Shayesteh with being removable as an alien who had 
been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), an aggravated felony, see § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a controlled-
substance offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   
 Before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Shayesteh acknowledged that the controlled-
substance offense would render an alien removable, but claimed that he was a United 
States citizen.  The Government challenged Shayesteh’s claim of citizenship; in support 
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of its position, the Government produced, among other things, I-213 forms1 from 1988 
and 2013 in which agents concluded that (i) Shayesteh was a citizen of Iran, and (ii) the 
fingerprints of the individual identifying himself as Benazad in 1988 matched the 
fingerprints of the man named Shayesteh who had registered as a lawful permanent 
resident; documents from both the mail-fraud and controlled-substance cases that 
identified the defendant as a citizen of Iran;2 documents that Shayesteh filed in civil cases 
in which he claimed to be a citizen of Iran; fingerprint cards and FBI analyses of those 
cards, in which the examiner determined that Shayesteh’s recently obtained fingerprints 
matched those of the individual who had identified himself as Benazad; and an affidavit 
from Officer Gingrich stating that, at his request, the offices of vital records for both 
Houston and Texas had searched for a birth certificate for Shayesteh but had been unable 
to find one.  Shayesteh zealously represented himself, and submitted an affidavit and 
testified in support of his claim of citizenship.  He did not provide any documentary 
evidence, but challenged the Government’s evidence as inadmissible and unreliable. 
 The IJ ruled against Shayesteh, finding that he was a citizen of Iran and 
consequently removable due to his mail-fraud and controlled-substance convictions.  
                                              
1 “An I–213 form documents the arrest of an alien unlawfully present in the United 
States.  In addition to the circumstances of the arrest, the form contains the name, alien 
number, address, date of birth, photograph, fingerprints, criminal and immigration 
history, and other information about the arrestee.”  Union Leader Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 749 F.3d 45, 49 n.2 (1st Cir. 2014). 
2 The documents also show that the District Court enhanced Shayesteh’s sentence for his 
controlled-substance conviction based on a finding that he had committed perjury. 
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Shayesteh appealed to the BIA, arguing both that the IJ’s ultimate conclusion was 
erroneous and that the IJ violated his due process rights in a variety of ways.  The BIA 
agreed with the IJ’s analysis of the case and dismissed the appeal.  Shayesteh then filed a 
timely petition for review to this Court. 
 We generally have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of 
removal.  While 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) limits our jurisdiction over removal orders 
entered against aliens who have committed controlled-substance offenses or aggravated 
felonies,3 we retain jurisdiction to consider Shayesteh’s due process challenges to the 
proceedings before the IJ, see § 1252(a)(2)(D), and his claim of citizenship, see 
Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the BIA’s 
denial of Shayesteh’s due process claims de novo.  See Barker v. Att’y Gen., 792 F.3d 
359, 362 (3d Cir. 2015).  As to Shayesteh’s claim of citizenship, we must determine 
whether a genuine issue of material fact is presented — if such an issue is not presented, 
we will decide the nationality claim, and if such an issue is presented, we will transfer the 
proceedings to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5); 
Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 421 F.3d 224, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 Shayesteh contends that the IJ violated his due process rights in a variety of ways.  
See generally Cabrera–Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(explaining that in immigration cases, the due process protections of the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee petitioners “the right to a full and fair hearing that allows them a 
                                              
3 Shayesteh acknowledges that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony.   
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reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf”).  He first argues that the IJ 
improperly placed the initial burden of proving nationality on him.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.8(c); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).  Shayesteh’s contention is 
entirely unsupported by the record.  The IJ repeatedly noted during the hearing that the 
Government bore the burden of proof, see A.R. at 359, 374, 378, 422, 591, 595, and then 
accurately stated and applied that standard in its opinion, see A.R. at 233-34.  Shayesteh’s 
argument to the contrary lacks merit. 
 Shayesteh also contends that it was improper for the IJ to order him to produce 
biographical information about his early years.  As an initial matter, we are not persuaded 
by Shayesteh’s contention that the IJ asked him to provide this information in an effort to 
elicit an inconsistency.  Rather, it appears to us that the IJ merely sought to ensure that 
Shayesteh, who was proceeding pro se, presented whatever evidence he could in support 
of his cause.  This reading is supported by the IJ’s opinion, in which the IJ turned to the 
information from Shayesteh only after concluding that the Government had met its initial 
burden.  In any event, to make out a due process violation, Shayesteh must establish that 
he was prejudiced, see Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006), and 
because the information he presented was not used against him, he cannot make that 
showing.   
 Shayesteh also argues that the IJ erred by conducting independent research on 
Westlaw, which disclosed two civil actions that Shayesteh had previously filed (and in 
which he admitted being a citizen of Iran).  This claim likewise lacks merit.  “Unlike an 
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Article III judge, an IJ is not merely the fact finder and adjudicator, but also has an 
obligation to establish and develop the record.”  Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d 
Cir. 2006).  Thus, we have recognized that an IJ may introduce evidence into the record.  
Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here, the IJ did not even take 
that step — the IJ merely called two judicial decisions to the parties’ attention and asked 
them to address the decisions at a future hearing.  See Constanza-Martinez v. Holder, 739 
F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2014).  The IJ did not violate Shayesteh’s due process rights in 
this respect.  See generally McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“a court may take judicial notice of a prior judicial opinion”). 
 Shayesteh next argues that his due process rights were violated by the introduction 
of the Government’s evidence, which he characterizes as “completely lacking 
authenticity, provenance and competence.”  Br. at 18.  We have explained that, in 
immigration proceedings, “[e]xclusion of evidence is exceptional,” and “evidence is 
admissible if it is probative and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien 
of due process.”  Fei Yan Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 273 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 Shayesteh challenges two categories of evidence.  First, he contends that the IJ 
should have excluded records from other federal-court cases, including the two civil 
cases he instituted, the criminal case in the District of Arizona concerning “Behrooz 
Benazad,” and the criminal case in the District of Utah.  This argument lacks merit.  The 
records that the Government presented were either certified by the clerk of the court or 
obtained by the Government from the electronic filing system, and Shayesteh has 
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provided no basis to question the documents’ accuracy.  See In re Velasquez, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 680, 685 (BIA 2012).  Indeed, in his hearing, he admitted to making the relevant 
statements contained in those documents.  Thus, the introduction of these records was not 
problematic. 
 Shayesteh also argues that the documents prepared by Government officials — 
such as the I-213 forms and the reports from the FBI —should have been excluded.  This 
argument fares no better.  Courts have long recognized that “agency action is entitled to a 
presumption of regularity,” Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(alteration omitted) (quoting McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1986)), and, 
consequently, that “records made by public officials in the ordinary course of their 
duties . . . evidence strong indicia of reliability,” Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d 
Cir. 1996); see Vlisidis v. Holland, 245 F.2d 812, 814 (3d Cir. 1957).  The I-213s and 
FBI documents fall squarely within this purview.  See, e.g., Antia-Perea v. Holder, 768 
F.3d 647, 657 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is well established that the I-213 is a presumptively 
reliable and admissible document.”); Chavez-Castillo v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1081, 1085 
(8th Cir. 2014) (affidavit from law-enforcement officer is presumptively reliable).  The 
Government says that the records came either from Shayesteh’s A-File or directly from 
an FBI agent, and Shayesteh has provided no basis to question those explanations.  See 
Fei Yan Zhu, 744 F.3d at 274.  Accordingly, we likewise deny this due process challenge.   
 Finally, Shayesteh argues that the Government failed to establish his alienage.  We 
are not persuaded.  First, the Government presented an I-213 from 1988 reporting that (a) 
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Shayesteh had been arrested and claimed to be Behrooz Benazad, an alien from Iran, and 
(b) a fingerprint examination revealed that “Benazad” was Shayesteh, who was identified 
in INS files as a lawful permanent resident.  Second, the Government provided an FBI 
fingerprint analysis matching Shayesteh’s fingerprints as taken in 2013 with the 
fingerprints from the so-called Benazad.  Finally, the Government presented numerous 
records of other proceedings — both criminal and civil — in which Shayesteh admitted 
to being a citizen of Iran.  This evidence was unquestionably sufficient to establish 
Shayesteh’s alienage.  See, e.g., Antia-Perea, 768 F.3d at 659; Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 259 
F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001).  Meanwhile, Shayesteh has provided only his own 
unsupported allegations, which are not sufficient to create a material dispute of fact.4  See 
Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002); Chavez-Castillo, 771 
F.3d at 1085 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.   
                                              
4 Further, a Government witness testified about his unsuccessful efforts to corroborate 
Shayesteh’s claims.  Most critically, while Shayesteh claimed to have been born in 
Houston, Texas, the offices of vital records searched in vain for a copy of a birth 
certificate documenting his birth.  We note that the agency also determined that 
Shayesteh did not testify credibly.  We need not reach that aspect of its decision given 
that the independent grounds discussed above are sufficient to deny the petition for 
review.  See generally Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011). 
